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he Commission published its 
proposal for a directive on 
migration for highly 
qualified employment on 23 
October 2007.
1 The question of first 
entry by third country nationals to 
the member states’ territory and 
labour market, while within the 
competence of the EC since 2001,
2 has been the 
hardest of the immigration and asylum powers 
on which to find agreement in the Council. The 
Commission made a first proposal in 1999, but 
that was withdrawn after it failed to find 
sufficient support. That first attempt by the 
Commission to achieve a directive on first entry 
for economic activities was characterised by a 
uniform approach – applying to all types of 
economic activity.  
In this second attempt, the Commission has 
divided up the field into sectors and is seeking to 
address it piece by piece. The reason for this is 
undoubtedly because the consultations that the 
Commission carried out before embarking on 
this venture indicated more support in the 
member states for highly qualified migration 
than for low-skilled. However, while such an 
approach may appeal to some interior ministries 
in some member states, as I will outline below, 
it also has its dangers. This proposal is 
accompanied by a second one designed to create 
a single procedure for labour migration and a set 
of common rights. The Commission states that 
the two are consistent. 
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Two measures, one adopted and one proposed 
by the Commission, increase the pressure on the 
EU to move towards a common position on 
economic migration. The first Directive 
2003/109 provides for free movement of third 
country nationals who have resided lawfully in 
the EU for five years or more and thereby 
acquire long-term resident status. They acquire 
the right to move and reside in any member state 
for economic purposes, including work (though 
member states can delay this by up to a year), as 
well as non-economic reasons. Thus, leaving 
first admission to the member states becomes 
generally less attractive when each member state 
individually controls first entry. In the interest of 
coherence, five years down the road when third 
country nationals get the right to move and work 
anywhere in the EU, there is an argument in 
favour of a common set of rules on first 
admission of labour migrants. 
Secondly, the Commission has proposed a 
measure creating a common system of sanctions 
against employers for engaging third country 
nationals without permission to take 
employment in the member states.
3 This 
proposal has run into substantial criticism from a 
number of organisations on the ground that it is 
not reasonable to sanction businesses for hiring 
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employees when there is no EU-wide measure 
that permits them to do so lawfully. Without a 
clear and common EU system whereby 
businesses can obtain permission to hire third 
country nationals, fining them for failing to do 
so lacks legitimacy. 
There are, however, two factors that must be 
taken into account: one that raises problems for 
Community action in the field, while the other 
limits the scope of action. First, free movement 
for workers who are citizens of the Union has 
not yet been achieved. For nationals of eight 
member states that joined the EU in 2004, 
transitional restrictions on free movement of 
workers are still being applied by a number of 
important labour destinations such as Germany 
and Austria. These restrictions are unlikely to be 
lifted until 2011. For workers from the two 
member states that joined the EU in 2007, the 
situation is even more difficult. For these 
workers, a (albeit small) majority of member 
states are applying transitional restrictions that 
can continue until 2014 (with a possible 
extension in exceptional circumstances). 
Citizens of the Union are excluded from the 
scope of the proposal so while a third country 
national could enjoy labour migration to, for 
instance, Germany under the proposal, a 
similarly qualified Czech or Bulgarian national 
is excluded. This is likely to cause political 
tensions in the Council.  
Secondly, many member states are already 
bound by international commitments in the field 
of labour migration which are primarily found in 
ILO Convention 97 (of which ten member states 
have signed and ratified) and the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on the Legal Status of 
Migrant Workers 1977 which ten Member States 
have signed (though a different ten from the ILO 
Convention). While the Council of Europe 
Convention is based on the principle of 
reciprocity, some important migrant sending 
countries for Member States are parties such as 
Moldova and Ukraine. Clearly, if the standards 
of the Commission’s proposal fall below the 
standards of these two international agreements 
then the Member States who are bound by the 
international agreements will not be able to 
support it. Sadly, on a first analysis of the 
proposal, this appears to be the case. 
This briefing note looks at the key issues arising 
in the proposal for a directive and sets out the 
main debates. So far, the proposal has elicited a 
fairly positive response from the business 
community.
4 Whether the initial enthusiasm at 
the possibility of establishing a common labour 
migration system is justified in light of the detail 
of the proposal is still open to question. 
The Objectives of the Proposal 
In December 2005, the Commission issued a 
Communication on a Policy Plan on Legal 
Migration (COM (2005) 669), which announced 
that between 2007 and 2009 it would put 
forward five legislative proposals on labour 
immigration. The new approach was to divide 
up economic migrants into categories: 1) highly 
qualified workers, 2) seasonal workers, 3) 
remunerated trainees and 4) intra-corporate 
transferees) and provide for their first admission 
separately in different instruments. These 
measures would also cover their rights and the 
procedures. 
Thus this proposal is the first part of the larger 
project. There has been some discussion about 
the wisdom and desirability of dividing up the 
area into sectors on the basis of type of work. 
The main concern is that highly qualified 
workers will receive more generous treatment 
than other workers which will institutionalise 
discrimination on the basis of skill level in the 
acquisition and enjoyment of labour rights. 
However, as the Commission got nowhere with 
its earlier proposal which covered all third 
country national workers, perhaps it considers 
the only way forward in the field is sectorally. 
The proposal states that it specifically aims at 
effectively and promptly responding to 
fluctuating demands for highly qualified 
immigrant labour. This objective causes some 
disquiet – how does the Commission propose to 
respond to dropping demand in a sector? Will 
there be sufficient protection for the individual 
who has moved across the world at the invitation 
of the EU against the termination of his or her 
work permit and dismissal from the labour 
market? At the moment, the proposal appears to 
protect the highly qualified worker from 
immediate exclusion from the labour market if 
he or she becomes unemployed. He or she will 
have a three-month grace period to find new 
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employment (which does not meet the standard 
in the Council of Europe Convention, which 
provides for five months). However, will this 
survive the negotiations in the Council? Further, 
when the Commission makes its proposal for the 
less-favoured economic migrants, will such 
protections, even if somewhat limited, be 
maintained? 
The proposal is intended to  promote circular 
migration.
5 This is an objective contained in the 
Commission’s communication of that name to 
encourage people to come and go between their 
country of origin and their country of 
employment. It has been criticised as an attempt 
to turn the clock back to the gastarbeiter (guest 
worker) programmes of the 1960s in Germany, 
Austria and the Benelux. Those programmes – 
which were based on the principle that no 
migrant worker would stay any substantial 
period in the host country, but would return and 
his or her place would be taken by another 
migrant worker – was of limited success. It was 
unpopular with employers who inevitable invest 
in the training of workers therefore prefer 
stability of their work force rather than endless 
change. It was also of limited success with 
migrant workers who once they got established 
in a job were reluctant to pick up stakes again 
and move back to their country of origin.  
The Commission intends the proposal to deliver 
a common fast-track and flexible procedure for 
the admission. This is an extremely valuable 
objective – the Commission should focus on 
achieving this if it wishes to make an ally of the 
private sector. The most frustrating aspects of 
labour migration for companies across the EU 
are: a) lack of clarity in the rules; b) lack of 
consistency in the application of the rules; c) 
uncertainty of the time scale within which a 
work permit and visa will be issued. All these 
factors result in uncertainty when (and indeed if) 
the individual will be able to start work in the 
right country at the right time for the business to 
succeed in its programme. If the Commission 
can do something about this weakness in the 
fragmented EU labour migration picture, it will 
rightly receive praise and support from EU 
businesses.  
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The Grounds for the Proposal 
The explanatory memorandum sets out the main 
arguments for highly qualified migration: the 
business argument – businesses need economic 
migrants to fulfil their recruitment needs; the 
demographic argument – the EU is no longer 
producing sufficient numbers of workers to 
meets its business needs; and the evidence of the 
failure of the current highly qualified regime 
exemplified by the fact that the highly qualified 
from the EU’s North African neighbours go to 
Canada and the US, rather than to the EU. The 
diversity of the member states’ schemes for 
highly qualified migration is also noted 
(apparently only 10 member states have such 
systems and the statistics on numbers admitted 
are far from satisfactory).  
The Specific Content of the Proposal 
Article 1 establishes the objective of the 
measure: a common set of rules for entry and 
residence of highly qualified third-country 
nationals and their family members and the 
conditions of their residence. 
Article 2 defines the key terms: 
•  Highly qualified employment means work 
(the Community law definition) “for which 
higher education qualifications or at least 
three years of equivalent professional 
experience is required”. The use of the 
Community law definition of employment is 
very wise. To try to devise a new definition 
exclusive to this area would only cause 
confusion regarding the interpretation. The 
definition of highly qualified employment is 
at the heart of the measure. As only 
economic migrants who fit this category will 
be admitted, and as the proposal is designed 
so that once an individual fulfils the 
conditions, he or she has a strong 
presumption of getting the Blue Card, how 
one decides who is highly qualified is 
central. The definition here is good – it 
includes higher education qualifications 
without limiting them too much – for 
instance there is no mention of universities, 
etc. Additionally, it is valuable as it permits 
flexibility – where the worker has three-
years equivalent experience. Of course the 
question what is equivalent may cause 4 | Elspeth Guild 
teething trouble but the flexibility is wise in 
order to meet business needs. 
•  The ‘EU Blue Card’ is supposed to allow its 
holder to reside and work legally in the 
territory of the issuing member state and 
(subject to important caveats which could 
render the possibility illusory) to move to 
another member state for highly qualified 
employment. This is the much publicised 
aspect of the proposal – a Blue Card for EU 
labour migrants which would mirror in some 
ways the US Green Card. Of course, there 
are very substantial differences – most 
notably, the Blue Card will not provide the 
security of residence and access to the labour 
market that the US Green Card does. 
Further, the Blue Card scheme does not 
create a right of entry for a labour migrant. 
•  "Higher education qualification" means any 
degree, diploma or other certificate issued by 
a competent authority attesting the 
successful completion of a higher education 
programme, namely a set of courses 
provided by an educational establishment 
recognised as a higher educational institution 
by the State in which it is situated. This 
means that the member states must accept 
the certificates of third countries’ 
institutions. This is a key component of the 
definition of a highly qualified migrant. The 
main issue here is how to bring about the 
recognition of diplomas where they will, in 
most cases, have been earned outside the 
EU. Even after almost 40 years, the system 
of mutual recognition of diplomas earned in 
the EU still creates headaches, particularly in 
regulated professions. The Commission may 
need to deliver more on this aspect if it 
wants to meet the needs of businesses. 
•  "Higher professional qualifications" adds the 
option of at least three years of equivalent 
professional experience while "professional 
experience" means the actual and lawful 
pursuit of the profession concerned. This 
part of the definition may help to resolve the 
problems of recognition of qualifications 
which the first part raises. It may, in the end, 
be easier to prove the individual has three 
years professional experience abroad – often 
a related business has employed the 
individual itself in the capacity for more than 
three years – than to go through what may 
become complicated recognition of 
qualification procedures. 
Article 3 sets out who is excluded (mainly 
persons seeking or receiving international 
protection – although why they should be 
excluded is something of a mystery – and those 
who have been expelled, etc.) and Article 4 
protects bilateral agreements but prohibits 
member states from applying more favourable 
rules in order to prevent competition among the 
member states for highly qualified employees. 
The Commission stresses in the Explanatory 
Memorandum that more generous provisions of 
national law are excluded. Whether this will 
survive the negotiations in the Council is 
questionable. Will the member states really be 
willing to abandon their power to ease labour 
migration requirements for favoured businesses? 
In such a sensitive area it may be hard to get 
such agreement. Further, it is not clear from the 
proposal whether the Blue Card scheme will 
replace national labour migration programmes 
for highly qualified or run along side them. If 
the latter is permitted, then the exclusion of 
more favourable conditions is clearly pointless 
as member states can just open or adjust a 
national scheme which has a lower threshold for 
admission. 
Article 5 sets out the conditions for admission of 
a highly qualified migrant, as follows: 
•  a contract/job offer for at least one year; 
•  compliance with regulated profession rules 
(as they apply to EU citizens) and for 
unregulated professions, the requirement is 
possession of a relevant qualification; 
•  sickness insurance (for the whole family); 
•  the individual is no risk to public policy, 
security and health (the traditional EU 
wording is used here); and 
•  a salary level that is at least three times the 
minimum gross monthly wage (or higher at 
member state discretion) in accordance with 
published rules; if there is no minimum 
gross monthly wage identifiable, then the 
social assistance level is taken as the 
comparator; this means there must be 
transparency in the salary levels required. 
These conditions are critical to the proposal as 
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precise and unambiguous criteria on the basis of 
which the individual and the businesses can 
regulate their affairs. The salary level is a sound 
criterion but it may not be wise to leave it to the 
member states to set higher levels than those set 
out in the proposal. The key is foreseeability for 
the business – before a business makes the 
decision of which employee to take on or to 
move around the world, it needs to be certain 
that it will be able to do so and will not run into 
insurmountable (and incomprehensible) 
obstacles from the state authorities. Businesses 
can make these decisions based on salary levels, 
but they need to have very precise rules. The 
sickness insurance requirement will cause 
headaches for member states that are parties to 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Convention 97 of 1949 concerning Migration for 
Employment and the Council of Europe 
Convention, as both require equal treatment with 
own nationals in this area (or exclude sickness 
insurance as a ground for family reunification, 
as in Article 12 of the Council of Europe 
Convention).
6 
Provided the individual meets the criteria of the 
highly qualified definition, and the job and 
personal circumstances fulfil the conditions of 
Article 5, both the business and the employee 
should be confident that the individual will be 
admitted and able to carry out the job, although 
as there is no right as such created in the 
proposal, there could be problems. However, 
there is a trump card that a member state can 
play against the business and individual: quotas. 
Articles 7 and 19(5) of the proposal allow 
member states to determine volumes of labour 
migration – i.e. quotas. A member state need 
only set the quota at zero to frustrate the whole 
project.  
Article 6 provides for a more relaxed set of rules 
for young workers under 30 years of age by 
loosening the income test. This will be helpful 
for recent graduates who wish to stay in a 
member state after their studies.  
Article 7 provides for the issue of an EU Blue 
Card which creates the presumption in favour of 
entry (and re-entry) to the member states and the 
rights contained in the directive which are: 
•  limits on withdrawal of a Blue Card; 
                                                 
6 See Article 6 ILO 97; and Articles 12 and 19 Council of 
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•  a time limit of 30 days in which the 
authorities have to make a decision 
(exceptionally extendable to 60 days); 
written notification of the decision and a 
right to remedies in event of refusal. 
•  For the first two years the individual is 
limited to paid employment activities which 
meet the conditions for admission (any 
changes must be authorised); after the first 
two years equal treatment with own 
nationals as regards access to highly 
qualified employment; this means he or she 
no longer needs to prove that the entry 
requirements are still met, although he or she 
can still be restricted to highly qualified 
employment; 
•  Limits on access to public service jobs 
together with a standstill for member states 
to continue to apply exclusion provisions 
that are already in existence; 
•  The right to look for work for a period of 
three months in the event of unemployment; 
•  Equal treatment with own nationals as 
regards wages and working conditions; 
freedom of association; education and 
vocational training (but member states can 
restrict access to grants); recognition of 
diplomas (but in accordance with national 
procedures); social assistance (but member 
states can restrict this to long-term resident 
third-country nationals); export of pensions; 
tax benefits; access to goods and services, 
housing and employment services (but 
member states can exclude access to public 
housing); free access to the territory of the 
member state;  
•  Family reunification under Directive 
2003/86 but with no need to show a prospect 
of permanent residence, a six-month time 
limit on determination of an application; no 
integration abroad tests; aggregation of 
residence periods in different member states 
to acquire a five-year permit. 
In general the list of rights is a step in the right 
direction, but there are problems in that the list 
does not conform either to the ILO 97 or 
Council of Europe Convention standards. The 
key problems are: 
•  Article 6 ILO 97 requires equal treatment 
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social security; Articles 13 and 18 of the 
Council of Europe Convention cover the 
same territory; 
•  Article 8 of the Council of European 
Convention prohibits binding a worker to 
one employer or territory after the first year; 
•  Article 9 of the Council of Europe 
Convention gives the worker five months 
(subject to an unemployment allowance 
proviso) to find a new job; indeed, EU 
nationals have the right to reside to look for 
employment in another member state for at 
least six months and longer if there is a real 
prospect of them finding employment; 
•  Article 12 of the Council of Europe 
Convention sets out the family reunification 
rules which do not include a sickness 
insurance requirement. 
The three-month limit on looking for work once 
unemployed not only causes problems with 
other international instruments. There are good 
reasons for allowing a person a longer period to 
find work. The labour market can change 
rapidly. The individual who has made the 
decision to move with the whole family to a 
member state deserves fair treatment in the 
event that he or she becomes unemployed. That 
fair treatment includes a reasonable period of 
time in which to find a new job in the event of 
unemployment. The threat of expulsion as soon 
as or shortly after an individual becomes 
unemployed plays into the hands of 
unscrupulous employers as it gives the employer 
too strong a position in the immigration status of 
the individual after he or she moves to the state. 
The employee who wants to remain in a member 
state may be coerced into accepting worse 
conditions or keeping quiet about breaches of 
labour (or company) law on the part of the 
employer because the individual’s immigration 
position depends too heavily on continued 
employment. 
The family reunification provisions are likely to 
be very contentious as they are substantially 
more favourable than those that apply to long-
term resident third-country nationals. So the 
directive will privilege third-country nationals 
who have never lived in the EU as regards 
family reunification over and above those who 
have lived their whole lives in the EU. This is 
likely to be hard to sell. Nonetheless, the 
derogations for the family reunification directive 
show clearly exactly where the big problems are 
with that directive. 
Article 9 provides that an application can only 
be refused where the applicant does not meet the 
requirements or presents falsified or fraudulent 
documents. Member states may still apply 
national rules on filling vacancies and give 
preferences to those already unemployed on 
their territory. Article 10 places limits on the 
withdrawal or non-renewal of a Blue Card 
which can only be on grounds that the individual 
no longer fulfils the conditions; failure to respect 
the conditions (other than notification after two 
years); or on public policy, security and health 
grounds. There is a certain lack of clarity in 
these provisions about what exactly the 
individual can and must do after two years and 
just how much freedom he or she will have at 
that time. While on the one hand, the 
Commission indicates that this is supposed to be 
an important staging point when the individual 
acquires a measure of independence from the 
business, on the other the actual wording of the 
provision does not seem to support this 
wholeheartedly. 
Article 11 deals with the application procedures, 
which are rather woolly: member states can 
decide whether it is the individual or employer 
that applies; but the application must be 
considered whether the individual is outside the 
EU or lawfully resident within it; and there is an 
obligation to facilitate visas. A number of 
member states are particularly anxious to move 
the whole of the immigration process abroad so 
that the individual who is coming to the member 
state for more than three months has fulfilled all 
the requirements before entry onto the territory. 
While this ambition is unrealistic, not least in 
the field of labour migration where often it is the 
result of an individual studying on the territory 
or some other encounter on the territory that a 
business becomes aware of them and decides to 
hire them, some member state have invested 
heavily in it. For this reason it seems unlikely 
that the Commission’s proposal that the 
processing of an application can take place 
either within or outside the member state is 
likely to survive. 
After two years of residence and exercise of 
economic activities in one member state, the 
individual and family members may be able to A First Look at the Commission’s Blue Card Initiative | 7 
 
go to another member state to carry out activities 
under the same conditions, but the possibility of 
labour market tests and quotas makes this a 
fairly uncertain option. The necessary 
procedural rules are set out to make sure that 
responsibility is gradually shifted from the first 
to the second member state in these 
circumstances. This is a sensible proposal, but it 
may well run into difficulties if it is not made 
more explicit and if the possible spoiling options 
left to the member states, like the application of 
quotas, are not reduced.  
In the final provisions there is a duty on the 
member states to report to the Commission 
annually and on the Commission to report to the 
European Parliament and Council on 
implementation of the directive every three 
years.  
Conclusions 
The Commission has reflected long and hard on 
how to achieve the final block in the legal 
migration bridge of the EU.  
This proposal begins a process of finalising the 
measures on labour migration in the EU for third 
country nationals. Sensibly the Commission has 
started with a most favoured group – the highly 
qualified. Presumably, it considers that if it can 
get agreement on this group, it can hang the 
proposals on the other groups on the back of this 
one. While the proposal has some important 
weaknesses, not least that it proposes better 
rights for newcomers than the EU has granted to 
its long-term resident third-country nationals, it 
provides a starting place for discussion and 
debate. If it is possible to achieve one smooth, 
efficient and quick procedure for businesses to 
fill their third-country national employment 
needs according to clear and precise rules, it will 
be a substantial benefit to the EU economy. About CEPS
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